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R645consideration of the consequences
of the next choice: ‘‘If I do this, will I
get my next reward?’’ (Note that
these processes may or may not be
‘conscious’ and indeed probably
are not.)
The switch between reverse and
forward replays constitutes a
segmentation of the replay event; this
segmentation was also evident in the
observation that ripple events were
entirely composed of within-arm
sequences and did not straddle the
choice point, even though the place
field representation was equally strong
there. Thus, joint replays seem to be
formed by discrete sub-events, with
each sub-event representing a spatial
unit spanning the entire length of a
single arm. The question arises as to
why replays did not arise in the middle
of an arm and run to the middle of the
adjoining arm — sequences appeared
to start and stop at nodal points in the
maze structure. The reason for this is
unknown, but nodes might perhapsbe places where place field sequences
during behaviour were interrupted,
either by stopping (at the end of an arm)
or by divergence (at the fork). Why
these nodes should be anchor points
for ripple sequences remains
an interesting question for future
investigation, as is the question of what
(mechanistically) determines the start
points, stop points and directionality of
the sequence segments.
This new study [7] adds to the
growing weight of evidence that the
hippocampus engages in active, offline
construction and consolidation of
internal environmental representations.
More than this, however, it reinforces
the venerable but much disputed idea,
first advanced by Tolman [8], that this
internal representation mirrors the real
world in a truly map-like way.References
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Chimpanzee and Bonobo MindsImproving methods for studying primate interaction are providing new insights
into the relationship between gesture and meaning in chimpanzee and bonobo
communication.Richard Moore
The philosopher Donald Davidson
posed the following puzzle [1]. For the
most part we understand what others
are thinking because we understand
the words and sentences that they
utter; but we understand what they say
only because we know which thoughts
their utterances typically express.
That makes knowing others’ minds
and knowing the meanings of their
words and sentences co-dependent.
Without knowing both, one cannot
grasp either. Davidson called this the
problem of radical interpretation. How,
he asked, could one overcome this
interdependence, to come to know the
minds of thosewhose language one did
not speak? Two papers in this issue of
Current Biology, by Hobaiter and Byrne
[2] and Genty and Zuberbu¨hler [3], help
to answer this question by providing
new insights into the relationship ofgesture and meaning in chimpanzee
and bonobo communication.
The problem of radical interpretation
is particularly acute when trying to
interpret the minds of non-human
animals. In the case of humans, we
can be relatively confident that their
thoughts about the world will be similar
to our own, and so use our impressions
of a scene as a guide to what they
might be saying about it. However, this
approach is unreliable where cognitive
similarity cannot be assumed. We
know that all species of great ape
use gestures to communicate
with one another, and that these
gestures are — as in human
language — produced intentionally,
causally inefficacious, and addressed
to audiences with particular
communicative intentions [4] (Figure 1).
Because these features are central
characteristics of human utterances
[5], ape gestures are meaningful inways analogous to our own. However,
knowing that ape gestures are
meaningful is very different from
knowing what those gestures mean.
The two new papers [2,3] provide
valuable new insights into the question
of what apes mean when they gesture
to one another. Hobaiter and Byrne [2]
produce a partial lexicon of the gestural
vocabulary of the Sonso community
of chimpanzees in Uganda’s Budongo
forest. They identify nineteenmeanings
distributed over 66 gestures — thereby
elaborating the closest thing we have
to a chimpanzee gesture phrasebook.
Genty and Zuberbu¨hler [3] document
a single gesture used by bonobos at
the Lola Ya Bonobo sanctuary in the
Democratic Republic of Congo. This
gesture is particularly striking because
of its similarity to one that we use and
recognise ourselves — making for an
intuitive interpretation of its content
that a more careful analysis
subsequently confirms.
In the ‘beckoning’ gesture that Genty
and Zuberbu¨hler describe [3], one
bonobo extends a hand in the direction
of a peer before turning and pulling
away, while sweeping the outstretched
hand back towards them and in the
direction of the turn — as if to say
‘‘Follow me!’’ or ‘‘Come here!’’. This
Figure 1. Two infant chimpanzees use gestures in play. (Photo: copyright Catherine Hobaiter.)
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males, to initiate a discreet sexual
encounter with a female peer.
Interpretation of this gesture is
intuitive, not only because we do
something similar, but because
the form of the gesture visually
resembles its apparent content. This
leads Genty and Zuberbu¨hler [3] to
conclude that it may be a rare case
of iconic gesturing in the Pan genus.
This is important because iconic
gestures are thought to have figured
heavily in the communication of our
early hominin ancestors [6,7]. Such
gestures would have enabled them
to compose potentially complex
messages by visually recreating
actions and events, without
possessing the skills for high-fidelity
imitation that greatly facilitate
conventional communication [8].
Insofar as the beckoning gesture
suggests the possibility of iconic
communication in our last common
ancestor, it is a potentially important
insight into the evolution of human
communication. At the same time, the
finding should be treated with caution.
True iconic communication wouldrequire that bonobos choose this
gesture because they recognise
that its form visually resembles the
message they intend to communicate,
and that this resemblance should
facilitate interpretation. Otherwise the
resemblance of content and formmight
just be a coincidence, unnoticed by the
gesturing individuals. We cannot know
from observation alone that bonobos
act with this insight. Nonetheless, the
beckoning gesture is an important
candidate for a phylogenetically early
form of iconicity. It is a compelling
case of a gesture that might be used
with the same underlying mental
states by human and non-human
great apes alike.
In the gestures described by
Hobaiter and Byrne [2], visual
similarity between gesture and
content is less evident — making the
route to interpretation less intuitive.
Nonetheless, it is shown that at least
some chimpanzee gestures are used
with stable semantic properties, in the
manner of human language.
Since the work of Paul Grice [5] in
the 1950s, it has been accepted that
the meanings of utterances can bespecified in terms closely related to the
intentions with which communicators
act. For words or gestures to have
established meanings is just for them
to be used consistently to express
particular communicative intentions.
These insights provide support for
a method of interpretation that has
previously been used to assign
meanings to the gestures of gorillas [9]
and orang-utans [10] in captivity,
and that has now been applied by
Hobaiter and Byrne [2] to a population
of wild chimpanzees. A gesturer’s
communicative goal is inferred by
observation of the outcomes that
seemingly satisfy its act of gesturing,
and contrasted with outcomes where
goals are not fulfilled. Where
the gesturer is satisfied with the
outcome, her intention was likely
realised — making this ‘apparently
satisfactory outcome’ (ASO) a good
approximation of the content of her
message.
Hobaiter and Byrne [2] use this
method to map gestures to the
social functions with which they are
used — and so identify which gestures
are used to initiate travel, to discourage
irritating behaviour, and so on. These
findings are exciting because of the
answer they hold out to Davidson’s
question. They constitute our
best guide yet to understanding
the utterances — and so in some
respects, the minds — of our nearest
cousins. At the same time, the lexicon
is a work-in-progress; an important
advance in a still-unfinished project.
Some of the reported gestures are
used with several different functions. In
some cases thismay be because— like
the English word ‘bank’ — they are
polysemous (that is, have multiple
meanings). In other cases, the intention
with which the gesture was produced
may be modelled only imperfectly by
the ASO method, because a gesture
produced with the same intended
meaning could be satisfied by more
than one response. Attention to this
possibility might help resolve some
troubling ambiguities. For example, the
‘arm swing’, ‘foot stomp’, and ‘hand on’
gestures described by Hobaiter and
Byrne [2] are said to possess two
primary meanings — to get another
to move closer (as if to say ‘‘Move
closer!’’), or further away (‘‘Move
away!’’). Were these gestures
genuinely polysemous, then these
apparently contradictory functions
might be problematic. A word that
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ought not to be a stable tool for
communication, since it would be an
unreliable indicator of its utterer’s
intention.
It may be that appearances here
are deceptive. In the case just
described, the gestures might have
a single, perhaps more general
meaning than is revealed by the range
of its ASOs — for example, ‘‘Move!’’.
Precisely how the addressee should
move would need to be inferred not
just from the gesture but from further
contextual elements too, like the
nature of social interaction in which
the gesture was produced (for
example, friendly versus antagonistic
interactions). In other cases, social
relationships may determine which
responses are satisfactory. For
example, the ‘reach’ gesture is used
to solicit climbing, proximity, or closer
contact. It may be that the gesture is
really used as a general request
for physical contact (analogous to
‘‘Hold me!’’) that is satisfied differently
depending upon the individuals
involved. Such a request might be
satisfied by climbing from an infant,
but by a gentle touch from an adult
male.
With more exhaustive analysis of
the context of gesture production,
ambiguities in the current lexicon
might be identified and resolved. Itmay be that utterances of ‘‘Move!’’ are
accompanied by facial expressions
or vocalisations containing further
information about the gesturer’s
intentions [11,12], or that satisfactory
responses to contact solicitations vary
with age and rank. Context-driven
analysis of the variance between
gestures and ASOs might therefore
reveal more univocal intentions
underlying different patterns of
response. Alternatively, it might not
support assignment to gestures of
more precise meanings. Here we
might conclude that gestures are
only general attention-soliciting
devices, with meanings analogous to
‘‘Hey!’’ or ‘‘Oi!’’ — as others have
supposed [4,7].
The gestural lexicon outlined by
Hobaiter and Byrne [2] is a huge
achievement for primate science. It
provides the most detailed answer yet
given to Davidson’s question with
respect to our nearest living relatives,
and the refinements suggested here
would not be possible without the
valuable dataset presented. At the
same time, radical interpretation can be
a momentous project, and the process
of interpreting chimpanzee minds will
not be accomplished quickly. Research
into the context-variant elements of
great ape gestural communication will
be especially valuable in the
completion of this task.References
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Regulation and BeyondIn budding yeast, the mating pathway activates Far1 to inhibit G1 cyclins in
complex with the cyclin-dependent kinase (Cln–Cdk). Yet, the molecular
mechanism has remained largely unclear for over 20 years. A recent report
helps shed light on this regulation.Mardo Ko˜ivoma¨gi
and Jan M. Skotheim*
Progression through the cell cycle is
controlled by cyclin-dependent
kinases (Cdk) in complex with cyclin
regulatory subunits. Cyclins
accumulate in distinct cell-cycle
phases to drive specific events. To a
first approximation, cyclin activity
increases as the cell progresses
through the cell cycle until plummeting
in anaphase upon activation of theAPC E3 ubiquitin ligase, which targets
many cyclins for destruction.
Interestingly, the cell cycles of fission
yeast and frog embryo extracts can
be driven by a single, highly active
mitotic cyclin [1,2]. In these single
cyclin models, it is presumed that
distinct cell-cycle events are initiated at
specific Cdk activity thresholds.
However, all organisms whose cell
cycles have been investigated have
many cyclins, which must have
important functions since theyhave not been lost through neutral
mutation.
The importance of cyclin specificity
for cell-cycle control was first
revealed by genetic studies [3]. For
example, the S-phase cyclins in
yeast and animals, Clb5 and cyclin A,
respectively, use a hydrophobic
patch to dock substrates and target
Cdk activity to initiate DNA replication
[4]. It is now appreciated that all
early cyclins in yeast likely have
docking sites to recognize specific
partners. This increased specificity
compensates for the fact that the
early cyclin–Cdk complexes are less
active when examined on model
substrates such as histone H1 peptide.
This new quantitative model, based
mostly on in vitro biochemistry,
proposes that there is a handoff from
more specific, but less active kinase
complexes to less specific, but more
